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The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which entered into 
force on December 1, 2009, extends the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) articles 206 
and 207 to embrace “foreign direct investment.”  This raises the question of whether the 
EU is now in a position to adopt a model BIT articulating a common policy on foreign 
direct investment (FDI). An EU policy on FDI could replace the disparate efforts of the 
27 member states, complementing and reinforcing their efforts and presenting a stronger 
image to the world, especially at a time when the EU appears to have lost ground to other 
jurisdictions as a preferred destination for FDI.1  
Suggesting the preparation of an EU model BIT for treaty relations with third 
states assumes that the EU is empowered to do so and has the competence to negotiate 
and ultimately to implement any such agreement. However, despite the expansion of the 
CCP to include FDI, there remain many doubts as to the capacity of the EU to embark on 
such a course alone. The obstacles are at once political (the reluctance of member states 
to abandon their authority here) and legal (the limited competence under the CCP to 
regulate the internal market). In this context, three models can be envisaged: 1) a BIT 
binding all EU member states and concluded by the EU alone; 2) a BIT concluded as a 
mixed agreement (signed by both the EU and each member state); or 3) a BIT relating to 
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EU action alone. Given the circumstances, the negotiation and implementation of a model 
BIT may only be possible as a mixed agreement with the willing concurrence of member 
states.  
EU competence over the CCP is exclusive, which has led some to suggest that 
member states must cease to negotiate BITs now that TFEU articles 206 and 207 are in 
place.2 However, it is by no means clear what the new CCP competence embraces. The 
CCP has been read by the ECJ to focus essentially outward, seemingly giving the EU 
authority to set the conditions for admission of foreign investment into the internal 
market, including the types of FDI and investors allowed and the conditions at the point 
of entry. But it is not clear that the CCP covers regulation of the standards of treatment of 
FDI in the internal market, as well as guarantees against performance requirements and 
expropriation. The TFEU does not define “foreign direct investment,” and the definition 
seems to exclude portfolio investment. It is also uncertain that the EU could commit to all 
forms of investor state arbitration. Certainly it could not commit to ICSID procedures as 
it is not a state. A further complication, which it shares with several federal states, is that 
it may not be able to recover the damages that it might be condemned to pay on behalf of 
member states’ peccadilloes.  
Given these limitations, a unilateral EU BIT would not be the equivalent of the 
standard BITs between member states and third states: hardly an attractive negotiating 
position from which to start. Further questions remain:  Would an EU BIT protect only 
against EU action or against the acts of all member states? If MFN and national treatment 
are offered, what will be the comparator – the EU or member states’ action? Would the 
EU seek to renegotiate the hundreds of BITs with third states? If this were attempted, 
there are many pitfalls in renegotiating BITs, at least with those countries that are already 
actively seeking to get out of their existing BIT obligations. In this regard it should be 
noted that hundreds of “outdated” air transport bilateral agreements still remain in place 
due to inertia and the difficulties of renegotiation. 
A related legal issue is posed by the 191 existing BITs between member states. 
Are they to disappear as did air transport bilateral agreements when EU competence over 
air transportation was exercised after 1989? So far, only the Czech Republic is willing to 
abandon its intra-EU BITs – perhaps because it has been an unsuccessful respondent in 
several investor-state claims? 
One should note that there is already a partial model EU BIT: the Minimum 
Platform for Investment for the EU FTAs. This is a curious document prepared by the 
Directorate General for Trade in 2006,3 focused primarily on establishment and trade in 
financial services providing investment services. It provides guidance to negotiators of 
EU trade agreements who may have a mandate to include provisions related to 
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investment. It does not read like a standard BIT, and it would have to be considerably 
amended and expanded to serve as a genuine model BIT. 
Surely a common legal standard regulating FDI in the EU is an eminently sensible 
goal: it would replace 27 competing jurisdictions with one high standard of protection; it 
would allow the EU to present a common face to the world on FDI issues; and it would 
serve as a powerful incentive to promoting global standards. But it would be foolish to 
minimize the obstacles that lie in the path of this laudable goal. 
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